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Estate. Planning Technique*
Thomas N. Tarleaut
Under the catch-all title of "Estate Planning Technique" one
might discuss insurance, the law of trusts, the problem of com-
munity versus separate property, the law of wills, the problem
of domicile, and the law of real property. Be that as it may,
this article is confined to a discussion of estate planning technique
in the light of the impact of the federal estate tax. The purpose
here shall be to compare some of the estate tax problems arising
in common law states with those encountered in community
property states.
By way of introduction, a passing reference to the obvious
seems warranted. Estate tax saving should always be subordi-
nate to the client's wishes as to the disposition of his property.
It is pointless to try to convince a man that there are tax
advantages in gift-giving if he has economic or family reasons
for keeping his property to himself. Of course, estate tax saving
becomes a more important ingredient of an estate plan as the
size of the estate increases. And finally-and most obvious-
since there are no fixed facts and many complex laws, there are
no fixed rules of estate planning.'
Consideration will be given to only three areas: (1) the
estate tax on the spouses, (2) skipping estate taxes on subsequent
generations and (3) taxation of inter vivos gifts.
I. THE ESTATE TAX ON THE SPOUSES
A. Prior to the Revenue Act of 1948
The estate tax on the first spouse to die involves a consid-
eration of the Revenue Act of 1948. What the estate tax lacks in
logic, it makes up for in pages of history. The Revenue Act of
* This article contains the substance of an address which the author
delivered to the Tulane Tax Institute, New Orleans, Louisiana, on November
21, 1952. The Tulane Tax Institute, which was held in New Orleans on
November 19-20-21, 1952, was sponsored by the College of Law and the College
of Commerce and Business Administration of Tulane University.
t LL.B., Columbia Law School (1929); Member, New York Bar.
1. Two recommended works are: Trachtman, Estate Planning (1951) and
Shattuck, An Estate Planner's Handbook (1948).
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1948, which introduced the concepts of income-splitting, and
estate and gift-splitting, was an answer to tax discrimination
between citizens of community property states and common law
states. The income tax discrimination had been crystallized over
twenty years ago in Poe v. Seaborn.2 During the 1932-1942 period
the Treasury sought to end income-splitting in community prop-
erty states alone by pressing for legislation making a joint return
mandatory. 3 The Treasury was unsuccessful and the cost to
community property states of maintaining their income tax
advantage was the loss of their estate tax advantages. Under
the 1942 Revenue Act, the entire community property was taxed
in the estate of the husband except such part as could be traced
to the wife's separate property, to her compensation for her
services, or to property derived originally from such compensa-
tion. Although the 1942 act introduced the concept of economic,
rather than legal ownership, it retained-somewhat inconsistently
-the concept of legal ownership to the extent that the wife, if
she predeceased her husband, was taxed on her half of the com-
munity. The 1942 legislation was upheld in the Supreme Court.4
Let us pause here to consider, in a very general way, the
estate planning of the 1942-1948 period, using as our assumption
that the husband owns all the property or that all the community
property was acquired through his efforts. The primary tool in
common law states was the life estate to the wife, remainder to
the children. If H died first, this disposition would result in one
estate tax on all of H's property, but no estate tax on the death
of W. If W died first, she would, of course, have no estate to be
taxed and the estate tax would still fall on H's entire estate. In
community property states this disposition was very satisfactory
only if W died first. Thus, if W's will gave H a life estate5 in
her legal one-half of the community, remainder over to children,
W would be taxed on her legal one-half and H on his subsequent
death' would only be taxed on his legal one-half. However, if H
died first, he could only dispose of one-half, since his wife was
entitled to a fee interest in the other half. Thus, even if he
2. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
3. Reihm, The Impact of Community Property Law on Federal Taxation,
4 Southwestern L.J. 161, 172-175 (1950).
4. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
5. Wherever reference is made to a division of property into life estate
and remainder, It Is intended to refer to the local law equivalent. For a dis-
cussion of usufruct-naked ownership equivalent in Louisiana, see Wisdom
and Pigman, Testamentary Dispositions in Louisiana Estate Planning, 1951
Tulane Tax Institute.
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gave her a life estate in his half, remainder over to children, he
would be taxed on the entire estate as economic owner thereof,
and she would, on her death, be taxed on her half. The com-
munity property states were, quite understandably, dissatisfied
with this estate tax disadvantage. The common law states, with
even greater cause for displeasure, chafed under their continuing
income tax disadvantage. These sources of irritation, as well
as others, finally penetrated the shell of the Congress and pro-
duced the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1948, truly cultivated
pearls.6 And like all pearls, the question for the stylish estate
planner is how to wear them.
B. Under the Revenue Act of 1948
1. Comparison Between Systems of Property Law. The
Revenue Act of 1948 gave the common law states their income-
splitting, and averted further secession from the common law
column.7 The 1948 act also repealed the 1942 estate tax legisla-
tion which had been so distasteful to the community property
states. In its place, the 1948 act gave the common law states the
privilege of estate-splitting. This it accomplished through the
concept of the marital deduction for property passing to the
surviving spouse.8 In the effort to create equality of treatment
between the community property state and the common law
state, Congress provided in effect that only a fee interest or its
practical equivalent would qualify for the marital deduction.9
It further provided that the marital deduction would be limited
to one-half of the "adjusted gross estate."10 The concept of an
6. See Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of
1948, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 1117 (1948).
7. The original roster of community property states was Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington.
Oklahoma (1945), Oregon (1947), Michigan (1947), Nebraska (1947), Hawaii
(1947) adopted the community property system prior to the Revenue Act of
1948. Pennsylvania tried to adopt the system but the legislative effort was
declared unconstitutional by the Pennsylvania court. Various states (Indiana
and Massachusetts) were considering adoption of the system. Shortly after
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1948, Oklahoma, Oregon and Michigan
discarded their community property laws.
8. Int. Rev. Code § 812(e).
9. Int. Rev. Code § 812(e) (1) (B) provides that no deduction shall be
allowed for a "terminable interest" (such as a life estate or an estate during
widowhood) provided (1) that an interest in the same property (such as the
remainder) passes from the decedent to a person other than the surviving
spouse, (2) that such interest passes or has passed for less than an "adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth," and (3) that such inter-
est may be possessed or enjoyed by such other person (or his heirs or
assigns) after the termination of the interest of the surviving spouse. The
provisos are important and U.S. Treas. Regs. 105, § 81.47a-(b) gives examples
of some "terminable interests" that do qualify for the marital deduction.
10. Int. Rev. Code § 812(e)(1)(H).
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"adjusted gross estate" was introduced merely to assist in defin-
ing the maximum marital deduction. In computing the adjusted
gross estate, the decedent's one-half of the community property
was to be excluded." In other words, the community property
was to be excluded in computing the maximum marital deduc-
tion. Thus, speaking generally, a husband in a common law
state worth $100,000 could, at his election, will1 2 at least $50,000
to his wife and thus procure a marital deduction limited to
$50,000. A husband in a community property state, assuming the
community property consists of $100,000, would automatically get
the split-estate advantage since on his death the wife could
normally get her one-half interest under the local law. He
could not get a marital deduction as to the $50,000 included in
his estate. There is an obvious tax advantage where the hus-
band's estate is split so that, as in the illustrations, two estates
are created upon which no tax is payable by virtue of the $60,000
estate tax exemption. So also, because of progressively increasing
rates, tax savings exist where the tax on the two estates would
be less than the tax on the husband's estate alone.'3 From these
illustrations, it is clear that the fundamental difference in the
estate planning techniques of the common law planner and his
community property brother is the fact that marital deduction is
voluntary and elective, whereas the operation of local law on
community property is not.
Compare the situation of Mr. Common who has a substantial
estate and a penniless wife and Mr. Community who has no
separate estate, an interest in substantial community property,
and a wife who has no separate property of her own. As to Mr.
Community and his wife, nothing need be done about the split-
ting of the community property: it is split automatically.
Estate planning for Mr. and Mrs. Community will largely entail
11. Int. Rev. Code § 812(e) (2) (B).
12. In order to obtain the marital deduction it is not necessary that the
property qualifying for the deduction be willed to the surviving spouse. In
order to obtain the deduction it is sufficient if the property "passes" to the
surviving spouse. Property "passes" under Int. Rev. Code § 812(e)(3) by
bequest or devise, by intestacy, by election to take statutory interest rather
than under the will, by right of survivorship as joint owner, etc.
13. The estate tax rates are not constantly progressive. Thus, the follow-
ing statement from Trachtman, Estate Planning, 27 (1951): "And it should
not be concluded that the marital deduction in the first estate will always
increase the aggregate Federal taxes on both estates, merely bcause the
surviving spouse's estate is substantial. If the estate of the spouse who dies
first is approximately $200,000, the surviving spouse's estate may be as much
as $300,000 without running into any increased Federal estate tax as a result
of taking the maximum marital deduction in the first estate."
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dispositions designed to skip estate tax on subsequent genera-
tions.14 As to Mr. Common, he has an election to forego the
marital deduction or to seek the benefit of less than the maximum
marital deduction. His reasons for not seeking a marital deduc-
tion could be such non-tax considerations as a desire to cut the
surviving wife off immediately upon her remarriage or a distrust
of the surviving wife's ability to dispose of the property at her
death. If he will not give his widow the practical equivalent of a
fee in any of his property, his estate can not claim a marital
deduction. A decision not to claim the maximum marital deduc-
tion could be based upon a desire to leave the widow only such
amount as would prevent her election to take against the will
or a disinclination to give a business interest to a wife. In addi-
tion to these problems of whether or not to take the marital
deduction and whether or not to take the maximum, counsel for
Mr. Common has the difficult problem of the method of obtaining
the marital deduction. In the short space of this article, one
cannot explore the various intricate methods of obtaining this
deduction and testamentary clause techniques. However, it is
suggested that in common law states a frequent technique is to
create a so-called marital deduction trust, in other words, a trust
comprising one-half of the adjusted gross estate, consisting of
assets that qualify for the marital deduction under the Internal
Revenue Code, and providing that the surviving spouse has a life
interest in the income and a general power of appointment over
the remainder. 15
Let us next consider the estate tax problems of Mr. Common,
whose property is valued at $500,000, and Mrs. Common owning
property of $200,000. Contrast this couple with Mr. and Mrs.
Community who own $500,000 in community; in addition, Mrs.
14. See Nossaman, New Regulations on Community Property, 88 Trusts
and Estates 344 (1949) and Nossaman, The Impact of Estate and Gifts Taxes
Upon the Disposition of Community Property, 38 Calif. L. Rev. 71, 74 (1950)
for a discussion of a testamentary disposition under which H puts the entire
community in trust, income to W for life, remainder to children, and W
elects to take under the will rather than claim her one-half interest out-
right. Will W be subject to estate tax under Int. Rev. Code § 811(c) on her
one-half of the trust corpus since by her election she has retained a life
interest in that property? Will a gift tax be imposed on the value of one-half
of the remainder as a result of W's election? Mr. Nossaman submits that
these questions have not as yet been answered by the courts. The curious
aspect of this disposition is that H succeeds in splitting the community for
tax purposes whereas a husband in a common law jurisdiction can not resort
to this means of fixing the rights of his children and still obtain the marital
deduction.
15. See Int. Rev. Code § 812(e)(1)(F).
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Community owns $200,000 as her separate property. What are
the estate tax objectives on the assumption that the husbands
will predecease their wives? The problem of Mr. Common's
counsel is, in addition to those heretofore discussed, one of mathe-
matics. His question, if he decides to take the marital deduction
and has a method for obtaining it, is how much of a marital
deduction is most advantageous tax-wise. If he takes the maxi-
mum marital deduction the husband's estate will be $250,000
and the wife's will be $450,000. From the purely tax point of
view, the planner could take a marital deduction of $100,000 and
thus equalize the two estates. As to Mr. and Mrs. Community,
the planner cannot hope to equalize the estate on the death of
the husband survived by his wife. Mr. Community's estate is
automatically $250,000 and the wife will have an estate of $450,000.
This would appear to be a discrimination against Mr. Community.
But now consider the same facts on the assumption that the wives
will die first. The common law planner will not seek to obtain
the marital deduction in the wife's estate. If he were to do that
Mrs. Common would be taxed on $100,000, and her husband
would be taxed on $600,000, that is, the wife's marital deduction
would be pyramided in the husband's estate at his higher bracket.
As it stands, the wife would therefore be taxed on her $200,000
and the husband would be taxed on his $500,000. The community
property couple fare better, assuming that the wife can take the
maximum marital deduction as to her separate property. 6 Her
estate would therefore be one-half of the community property
($250,000) and one-half of her separate property ($100,000), or
$350,000. The husband on his subsequent death would have an
estate of $350,000 as well. It is clear from this illustration that,
unlike the common law planner who must always wrestle with
the "why" and "how" and "how much" of the marital deduction,
the planner in a community property state must tackle these
problems only when one of the spouses has separate property.' 7
16. For a discussion of the Louisiana system of forced heirship, i.e., the
entitlement of descendants and parents to the decedent's property, and its
effect on the maximum marital deduction, see Wisdom and Pigman, op. cit.
supra note 5, 245-247.
17. It is necessary for the decedent-spouse to have separate property in
order for the marital deduction to apply. However, it is not necessary that
the separate property itself pass to the surviving spbuse. The transfer of
community property to the surviving spouse-once it has been determined
that the decedent can obtain a marital deduction because of the existence of
separate property-will qualify. As to the gift tax, however, the marital
deduction does not apply to a gift of community property. See Appleman,
How Gifts and Estates Are Taxed in Community Property States, in The
Estate Tax Handbook 315, 334 (Lasser ed. 1951).
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But the very words "separate property" are a problem in them-
selves for community property estate planners.
2. The Problem of Separate Property. While it is true
that community property problems arise occasionally in common
law states, the problem of "separate property" in community
property states is constantly recurring. Of course the status of
property as "separate property" is primarily a problem of the
local community property law. But the Internal Revenue Code
prescribes, in some measure, its own definition of "separate
property." Where community property was converted into sep-
arate parts after the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1948, such
separate property is considered community property for the
purpose of computing the maximum marital deduction.'8  In
other words, if the decedent's estate consisted only of an interest
in community property and such converted property (separate
property for local law purposes), there would be no marital
deduction. The reason for denying the marital deduction for
such property is made evident by an illustration. If community
property of $200,000 is converted into separate property of H
and W after April 2, 1948,19 there is no gift tax. On the death of
H, if the marital deduction applied to his $100,000, H would suc-
ceed in passing another $50,000 to W free of any transfer tax.
By denying the marital deduction to such separate property, the
objective of permitting only 50% of the property to pass free of
tax is maintained. Since the Treasury took the position that
conversions during the 1942-1948 period were subject to gift tax,
a marital deduction is available as to such separate property.
The rule that certain separate property shall be considered com-
munity property for the purpose of computing the maximum
marital deduction applies to community property which was
converted during 1942. The rationale here again is the absence
of a gift tax on such conversions. This policy should have equal
application to pre-1942 conversions. However, because of tracing
difficulties, the rule does not apply to such pre-1942 conversions.
The rules for computation of the adjusted gross estate in com-
munity property states and the special rule for California com-
18. Int. Rev. Code § 812(e)(2)(C).
19. Community property which was converted to separate property during
the period 1942 to April 2, 1948 (the, date of enactment of the Revenue Act
of 1948) retains its status as separate property for tax purposes. The Treasury
takes the position that a gift tax was payable on conversion during that
period.
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munity property are set forth in the Regulations. 20 The repeal
of the distasteful 1942 legislation did not, therefore, eliminate
entirely the difficult problems of segregating separate property
from community property.21
3. New Basis Provisions for Community Property States.
One further change in the 1948 act is of particular interest to the
estate planner. The basis of property acquired by inheritance is
the fair market value at the date of death. 22 In a common law
state, the husband's low basis property could at his death take
the higher date-of-death valuation as its tax basis without an
income tax on the appreciation. In the inflationary period of
the last decade, this stepped-up basis was, and still is, advan-
tageous from a tax point of view. Since planners can only pro-
ject present facts, they continue to hold low basis property in
the estate while making sales of high basis property to obtain
income tax losses. Prior to 1942, this present advantage was not
available to the same degree in community property states. Com-
munity property passing to the surviving spouse by operation of
the local law did not take a new basis. The 1948 act, although it
restored the pre-1942 law generally in community property states,
did modify this rule as to basis of community property. Under
the present law, the interest in community property passing to
the surviving spouse may take the value at date of death as its
new basis.23 In general, the new law creates equality between
citizens of common law and community property states under
the more usual circumstance of property owned entirely by the
husband who predeceases his penniless wife. However, where
the wife predeceases the husband, her death has no effect on the
basis of property owned by the common law husband whereas, in
most community property states, her death changes the basis of
one-half of community property held by, and, it shall be assumed,
acquired by the efforts of, the husband. Under present inflation-
ary pressures, the community property husband may be very
20. U.S. Treas. Regs. 105, § 81.47(d). The next-to-last sentence of Int.
Rev. Code § 812(e)(2)(B) excepts from the definition of "community prop-
erty" pre-1927 community property in California. Prior to July 29, 1927, the
California wife had an "expectancy" in the community property and there-
after she had an undivided half interest. Commentators in this field make
a special point of noting that it is possible that the statutory language of the
code is not limited to the pre-1927 California system. For gift tax provisions,
see Int. Rev. Code § 1004(a)(3)(F); U.S. Treas. Regs. 108, § 86.16c.21. See Kelleher, The Marital Deduction under Louisiana Law 283 (1951
Tulane Tax Institute).
22. Int. Rev. Code § 113(a)(5).
23. Ibid.
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pleased at this unlooked for tax advantage. But the price for
the present edge may come in some future deflationary period
when the surviving husband may be dismayed to discover that
one-half of the property acquired by him at a high cost takes as
its income tax basis the lower value on the death of his com-
munity property wife. Presumably this new basis provision will
have its effect on estate planning for community property both
as regards conversion of separate property into community prop-
erty and as to any program of inter vivos gifts. 24
4. Planning for decedent's income. It sometimes happens
that an important asset of a husband's estate is compensation
earned during life by the husband and paid by his employer
after the husband's death. Consider, for example, the fees which
lawyers and accountants earn but which remain unpaid at death.
These amounts may be received shortly after death and, if they
are sizeable, they may be subject to high income taxes. It is
conceivable that the estate planner intent on computations of
estate tax may overlook opportunities for tax savings on this
post-death income.
Income such as the items heretofore described is taxed
under Section 126 of the code. That section provides that "items
of gross income in respect of a decedent which are not properly
includible" in the final or any prior return of the decedent shall
be taxed in the year received to the decedent's estate or bene-
ficiary actually receiving such amount. Section 126 (a) (3) fur-
ther provides that this "income in respect of a decedent" shall
have the character which it would have had in the hands of the
decedent if the decedent had lived and received such amount. In
a community property state it would seem that such Section 126
income is automatically split between the surviving wife and
her husband's estate.25 Such post-death income splitting is denied
to the common law couple.2 6
The prospective decedent in a common law state cannot rely
24. See Flint, Estate Analysis in Community Property States, 86 Trusts
and Estates 473 (1948) for a comparison of the advantages of community
property over separate property with emphasis on the apportionment of
probate costs.
25. See I.T. 3931, 1948-2 C.B. 87. Note that the problem of the wife's
ownership of a share in Section 126 income is different from the problem of
the divisibility of all income between the decedent's estate and the surviving
spouse.
26. The last possibility for income-splitting between a common law couple
exists relative to the decedent's prior-to-death income tax return. See Int.
Rev. Code § 51(b)(4).
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on his local law to accomplish any tax savings. As to Mr.
Common, he can bequeath the right to receive such income to
several beneficiaries. By doing so he reduces the income tax
which otherwise would be payable by his estate as the only
recipient. Mr. Community can perhaps do likewise as to his
half share of the income which will be paid after his death.
Mr. Common has a further problem relative to Section 126
income. Under Section 126 the recipient of "income in respect of
a decedent" is entitled to an income tax deduction for estate
taxes paid with respect to such income. This income tax deduc-
tion is limited to "the estate tax attributable to the net value
for estate tax purposes" of such item.2 7 What happens when the
Section 126 income is the property used to qualify for the marital
deduction? Will the commissioner contend that no estate tax
was paid as to such property and that therefore no estate tax is
attributable to such Section 126 income? The question has not as
yet been squarely ruled upon.28 The danger of losing this income
tax deduction, if it exists, may be avoided by using other. prop-
erty to qualify for the marital deduction.
This problem of the interaction of Section 126 and the mari-
tal deduction may exist for the community property estate
planner. In most instances, the right to Section 126 income is
community property.20 If no separate property exists, there is,
of course, no problem of marital deduction. If separate property
does exist, the code does not require that the separate property
itself pass to the surviving spouse. A transfer of community
property-once the marital deduction is obtainable by virtue of
the existence of separate property-will qualify for the marital
deduction. The estate planner in a community property state
should also avoid passing the right to Section 126 income as the
property qualifying for the marital deduction.
A recent letter ruling8 ° seems to indicate that wherever the
maximum marital deduction is taken the income tax deduction
for Section 126 income is necessarily reduced. Without burdening
27. Int. Rev. Code § 126(c).
28. See Informal Ruling, 52-5 C.C.H. Standard Federal Tax Reporter, Par.
6162 (March 17, 1952).
29. The determination of the Statutes of Section 126 income as com-
munity property is, of course, a question of local law. Be that as it may, it
would seem that estate planning relative to such income would usually
involve compensation, a form of income which enures to the community.
30. See Informal Ruling, 52-5 C.C.H. Standard Federal Tax Reporter, Par.
6162 (March 17, 1952).
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the reader with various computations, it is submitted that in
planning estates where large amounts of Section 126 income are
involved, consideration should be given to increasing the income
tax deduction by decreasing the marital deduction.
5. Summary. In summary, as to the changes brought about
by the Revenue Act of 1948, the orientation in common law states
is completely new. Instead of the all-out effort to avoid a "second"
tax on the wife by giving her a life estate in all the husband's
property, much time, effort and mathematics go into creating the
"second" tax in the expectation that the "first" and "second" taxes,
by use of the marital deduction, will both combined be less than a
"first" tax on the husband alone. In the community property states
the pre-1948 headache of "tracing" the source of the community
property has been replaced with the problem of segregating
separate property from community property under federal def-
initions of those words. If no separate property is found, the
problem of selecting alternatives-the basic questions of whether
and how much of a marital deduction to take-is out. If separate
property does exist, then the community property planner has
the same problems as his fellow aspirin-swallower in a common
law state, 1 including the problem of local law limitations on the
amount of disposable property.
II. SKIPPING ESTATE TAXES ON SUBSEQUENT GENERATIONS
Thus far, we have dealt exclusively with the surviving spouse
and with, generally speaking, only one-half of the decedent's
estate, or to the community property lawyer, the one-half inter-
est of the survivor in the community. What about the other
half? We are now faced, again from the exclusively tax view-
point, with the problem of skipping estate tax on subsequent
beneficiaries. Of course, this problem of skipping estate taxes
must always be considered in the light of local law limitations
on the amount of the disposable property. An estate tax on the
subsequent generation can be avoided by inter vivos transfer
from, for example, a grandfather to his grandchild. But it is right
in this area that the planner-in both the common law and com-
31. The endeavor of the Revenue Act of 1948 to achieve equality in tax
treatment between citizens of common law states and community property
states has failed in several aspects. In addition to the fact that, unlike the
situation in community property states, estate splitting is not available in
common law states where the penniless wife predeceases her rich husband,
there are continuing inequalities which are brought out in Surrey, op: cit.
supra note 6, and De Wind, The Approaching Crisis in Federal Estate and
Gift Taxation, 38 Calif. L. Rev. 79 (1950).
I
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munity property states-is met with the normal resistance to
parting with dominion and control of property during life. The
problem therefore becomes one of disposing of property at death
in accordance with the testator's desires, within the framework
of the local law, and pursuant to a plan that avoids estate tax
on subsequent beneficiaries to whatever extent possible. Obvi-
ously, one such beneficiary of the other half can be, and fre-
quently is, the surviving spouse.8 2 Be that as it may, it will be
assumed in subsequent illustrations that children and grand-
children are the beneficiaries of the other half.
A standard method for skipping an estate tax is a life estate
to the child, remainder to the grandchild.88 On the death of the
child, no estate tax will be imposed. But this desirable tax result
has obvious non-tax disadvantages. What if the income interest
is inadequate? What if the testator has misgivings as to fixing
the rights of an infant grandchild who may prove to be undeserv-
ing? Furthermore is it possible to skip the estate tax even on the
grandchild? Some of the answers to these questions are found
in the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951. And the following
short discussion is pertinent to those jurisdictions which recog-
nize the power of appointment.
8 4
A. Powers of Appointment Act of 1951
For purposes of this article, it is unnecessary to develop the
historical background of this 1951 legislation. 8 If the client is
not the donee of a power and has made no previous disposition
of his property, the estate planner is free to ignore the varying
tax treatment of powers of appointment created before 1942.
Consideration will only be given to powers of appointment which
may be used at some future time. Under the 1951 legislation a
general power of appointment is one which may be exercised in
32. See De Funiak, Principles of Community Property § 198 (1943) (in
Nevada and New Mexico the wife has no power of testamentary disposition
over her half if she predeceases her husband). See Seghers, Powers of
Appointment in Testamentary Trusts, 30 Taxes 679 (1952) for a discussion of
the non-marital deduction trust for the widow in common law jurisdictions
particularly.
33. Systems of forced heirship in Idaho and Louisiana limit planning for
estate tax savings but these barriers do not appear to exist in other com-
munity property jurisdictions. See De Funiak, ibid.
34. See Wisdom and Pigman, op. cit. supra note 5, for a discussion of
the illegality of the power of appointment in Louisiana. See Texas L. 1951,
S.B. 34; California L. 1945, Ch. 318; Oregon L. 1947, Ch. 91; Hawaii L. 1947,
Act 126, dealing with release of powers of appointment.
35. See Craven, Powers of Appointment, Act of 1951, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 55
(1951).
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favor of the donee of the power, his estate, his creditors or the
creditors of his estate.36 If the donee of a general power dies, the
property which is subject to that power is included in his estate.
Thus, if the client creates a testamentary trust giving his child a
life estate and a general power to appoint the remainder, the
corpus of that trust will be included in the child's estate whether
or not he exercises that power. From the tax viewpoint, the
child's interest in the property is tantamount to a fee. However,
if the client gives his child a life estate and a limited power to
appoint the remainder, there is no estate tax on the appointive
property at the death of the child. A limited power is any power
except a general power. Excluding the child from the power to
appoint to himself, his estate, his creditors and his estate's
creditors leaves ample room for choice of heirs, such as deserving
grandchildren or practically anyone else to whom the child
appoints. Clearly, the limited power of appointment is an impor-
tant tool to the estate planner since it permits skipping estate
tax on one generation while permitting, if the father so desires,
substantial latitude in the child's selection of the remaindermen.
It should also be noted that the child-assumed to be the donee
of the power-need not necessarily appoint the property outright
to his appointees-assumed to be grandchildren. The child could,
through a proper exercise of the power, postpone the impact of
the estate tax until the great-grandchildren's generation. He could,
if permitted by rule against perpetuities in his particular state,
give the grandchildren a life interest with remainder over to the
great-grandchildren.
More than likely the testator, the Noah of the above men-
tioned generations, is too pessimistic about our civilization to
worry about skipping estate taxes on the grandchildren. He will
probably be quite satisfied with skipping the estate tax on his
child's estate and be much more concerned with the fact that
his child-the one whom he really desires to benefit-is limited
to the enjoyment of a life estate. Here again, particularly in
common law jurisdictions, the *Powers of Appointment Act
benevolently supplies a remedy. The child, in addition to the life
estate, could be given the power to withdraw up to $5000 a year
out of the principal of the trust.37 If the child does withdraw
36. Int. Rev. Code § 811(f)(2), (3).
37. Int. Rev. Code § 811(f)(5). The statute is not phrased in terms of
withdrawal power. In fact it applies to any lapsed power of appointment
with certain limitations.
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money and consumes it, the money will not be in his estate at his
death. If he does not withdraw, his failure to withdraw his
annual $5000 could, were it not for the 1951 legislation, give rise
to both gift and estate taxes on him. Prior to the 1951 law, the
Treasury took the position that permitting such a power to
lapse was, in effect, a transfer of a remainder interest in the
$5000 with a reservation of life income. Such a transfer, accord-
ing to the pre-1951 theory, was subject to gift tax on the transfer
of the remainder interest and to estate tax on $5000 since a life
income therein was, under the trust, reserved to, the child. The
1951 act has changed that result. If the child never exercises his
power to withdraw the annual $5000, there is no annual gift tax
and no estate tax on the annual lapses of the power preceding
the year of death. In the year of death, only $5000 is included
in the child's estate. For illustration purposes the dollar limita-
tion of $5000 set forth in the code has been used. In fact, the
withdrawal power can be the greater of $5000 or a percentage
of the corpus. Use of the percentage limitation, rather than the
straight $5000 limit, entails certain difficulties which, in practice,
inclines a planner to express the withdrawal privilege in the
dollar amount.88
In addition to the power to invade corpus, the Code now
exempts from estate tax property over which the decedent has
a power to withdraw from the principal where the power is
limited by an ascertainable standard relating to his health, edu-
cation, support or maintenance.89 Thus, if the father is concerned
about enlarging the enjoyment of his immediate heir, the child,
he could give the child such a power and still achieve the objec-
tive assumed here, that is, skipping the estate tax on a subse-
quent generation. If the child never exercised this limited
power, there would be absolutely no tax consequences since the
power is specifically excluded from the Code definition of a
''general power."
Thus far the testamentary aspects of estate planning have
been discussed and, summarizing the differences between estate
planners under the two systems of property law, one could say
that the problem of skipping estate tax on subsequent generations
38. Int. Rev. Code § 811(f)(5)(B) provides that the withdrawal power
may be up to 5% of the aggregate value of the corpus at the time of the
lapse (non-exercise) of the power. Because of the inability to project the
future value of corpus, the $5000 limitation may be preferable.
39. Int. Rev. Code § 811(f)(3) (A).
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is similar (except for local law inhibitions on testamentary dis-
position) and that the problem of minimizing estate taxes
between the spouses is much the same where separate property
is held by one of the spouses in a community property state.
III. INTm VIvos TRANSFERS
Inter vivos transfers can accomplish one of the objectives
already discussed, that is, skipping estate tax on subsequent gen-
erations. But more than the estate tax advantage is involved.
Since the income of transferred property is thereafter taxed for
income tax purposes to the transferee, a shift in income tax is,
of course, accomplished. Furthermore, since the transfer fre-
quently takes the form of a gift, the gift tax is involved. Inter
vivos transfers therefore involve quite frequently a careful
computation of the incidence of all three federal taxes.
A. Advantages of Inter Vivos Gifts
The advantages of inter vivos gifts are so familiar that only
brief reference need be made to them. The pre-1948 income tax
advantage of making gifts to a spouse in a common law state no
longer exists since the enactment of income-splitting provisions
of the Code.40 However, the income tax advantages do exist
where income-producing property is given to a child whose surtax
bracket is substantially lower than his father's. From an estate
tax point of view, the estate tax can, of course, be avoided in the
child's generation by making the gift to the grandchildren. As
between the two spouses, they can avail themselves of a $60,000
specific exemption 4' and an annual exclusion of $600042 as applied
to gifts of present interests.43 The annual exclusion applies to
any number of donees so that a fairly substantial amount of prop-
erty can be donated annually during life over and above the
$60,000 exemption without imposition of the gift tax. Further-
more, because of the differences in the rate of tax, 44 transfer by
gift can provide tax savings and, obviously, inter vivos gifts come
out of the estate of the potential decedent at his top bracket and
are taxed at the lower gift tax bracket.4 5 Of course, inter vivos
40. Int. Rev. Code § 12(d).
41. Int. Rev. Code §§ 1004(a)(1) and 1000(f).
42. Int. Rev. Code §§ 1003(b)(3) and 1000(f).
43. Int. Rev. Code § 1003(b)(3).
44. The gift tax rates are 75% of the estate tax rates.
45. The operation of the gift tax is cumulative, see Int. Rev. Code 9
1001(a).
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transfers lose their tax appeal when the gift tax bracket exceeds
the estate tax bracket.
B. Estate Taxation of Inter Vivos Transfers
With these highly generalized statements on the advantages
of making inter vivos gifts, let us, in an equally general way,
review those sections of the Code which tax property which had
been transferred inter vivos. If a person makes a transfer reserv-
ing a life interest in the property transferred, 46 if he retains a
power to change the beneficial enjoyment of the property trans-
ferred,4 7 if he makes a transfer which the Code describes as one
intended to take effect at death,4 8 then such property will be
included in his estate. Furthermore, if he makes a gift in con-
templation of death, such gift will be taxed in his estate unless
the gift was made more than three years prior to the date of
death. 49 A transfer made during the three year period is pre-
sumed to be made in contemplation of death. To the extent that
the three-year period is still a hurdle for estate planners, any
material which would rebut the commissioner's contention that
the transfer was motivated by the thought of death should be
preserved.
C. Inter Vivos Business Arrangements
The foregoing comments generally answer the questions as
to why to give, how much to give, how to give, and to whom to
give. The remaining considerations are what to give and any
other arrangements which offer ultimate estate tax advantages.
It frequently happens that the major asset of a client is his
stock in his one-man corporation. If there is but one class of
stock, he could, of course, make a gift of a minority interest to,
for example, his children. The obvious disadvantage to making
such a gift is the possible difficulties of selling the majority
interest which he retains. Minority interests in a corporation, if
hostile, can become a thorn in the side of the donor or of his
vendee. The obvious solution to retaining complete control of
the corporation is to create some sort of junior security so that
the father can retain control through his senior securities and can
make gifts of junior securities to the subsequent generations. The
inter vivos disposition of these junior securities reduces the do-
46. Int. Rev. Code § 811(c)(1)(B).
47. Int. Rev. Code § 811(d).
48. Int. Rev. Code §§ 811(c)(1)(C) and 811(c)(3).
49. Int. Rev. Code §§ 811(c)(1)(A) and 811(1).
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nor's estate and creates possibilities for shifting of income to low
bracket donees. Of course, if it is necessary to recapitalize or
reorganize the corporation in any way, the income tax conse-
quences of that act should be carefully considered. 0 In addition
to the disposition of junior securities, another type of property
should have priority in any plan for lifetime transfers. It is sug-
gested that property of problematical valuation-property which
may entail a long drawn out valuation fight on the decedent's
death-might well be transferred during his lifetime. It would
seem that the owner of such property could be an invaluable
witness should his valuation be attacked. Furthermore, a valua-
tion established during life for gift tax purposes, may, in some
instances, be persuasive as to the value of similar property
retained by the decedent until his death.
In connection with valuation, let us return to the problems
of the impact of the estate tax on the decedent's stock in his
corporation. This time, consider the case of two stockholders or,
alternatively, two partners. What if the major asset in the
estate of the decedent is such a 50% interest in a business? What
can be done during life to establish a valuation for this business
interest? What can be done to prevent the interest from falling
into the hands of individuals who may challenge the guidance
of the surviving business partner? Will the decedent's heirs be
required to liquidate a part of the business interest which they
inherit in order to pay the estate taxes and administration ex-
penses?51 The answer to these questions may be in a binding
agreement under which the two partners or two stockholders
agree to sell their interest to the survivor at a fixed fair purchase
price. Each partner procures insurance on the other's life and
the lucky survivor pays the purchase price out of the proceeds
of such insurance. Although the Treasury challenged similar
arrangements by seeking to tax both the insurance proceeds
and the business interest in the estate of the decedent, the Tax
Court included in the gross estate only the value of the business
interest as fixed by the unconditional obligation to sell at a given
price.52 The Treasury's acquiescence in the Tax Court decision
is significant.5 8 No further effort to tax both the business inter-
50. Int. Rev. Code & 112(g).
51. In connection with the problem of redemption of stock to pay estate
taxes, see Int. Rev. Code § 115(g).
52. Ray E. Tompkins, 13 T.C. 1054 (1949), Acq. 1950-1 C.B. 5; Estate of
G. C. Ealy, 10 T.C.M. 431 (1951).
53. Ray E. Tompkins, 13 T.C. 1054, Acq. 1950-1 C.B. 5.
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est and the insurance proceeds on the ground that the decedent
indirectly paid the premiums is anticipated. However, tax aspects
of plans other than the cross-insurance pattern should be closely
scrutinized.
In addition to the buy-and-sell agreement, a binding option,
even though unilateral, will establish the value of decedent's
business interest where the parties are dealing at arms' length,5 4
where the option fixes a purchase price which is deemed adequate
as of the time the option is granted, 55 and where the decedent
could not have disposed of the optioned property prior to his
death. 56 Of course, reciprocal options between stockholders or
partners have, under the same conditions, established date-of-
death value. 57
IV. CONCLUSION
Conclusions have been summarized at various points in this
article. Once again, it is conceded that a general survey fails to
take into account the many local laws dealing with the power of
testamentary disposition, the use of the trust device, the rule
against perpetuities and the power of appointment. And again
it is urged that estate planning technique should involve much
more than estate tax savings.
Finally, one further thought warrants expression. The dis-
cussion herein has been premised on the existence of a substan-
tial estate. But the existence of such an estate is, in turn, based
upon the ability to accumulate property. And the power to
accumulate in this inflationary period of sharply progressive
income taxes depends in good measure upon the organization of
one's business affairs so as to minimize the impact of income
taxes. In many cases, therefore, in order to have the estate upon
which to apply estate planning techniques, it is necessary first
to minimize income taxes. In the majority of cases the vehicle
that drives the client to the lawyer's office is an income tax horse
pulling an estate tax cart. If taxes are a paramount considera-
tion in the client's affairs, it is submitted that it is obviously
wrong to put the cart before the horse.
54. See Claire Giannini Hoffman, 2 T.C. 1160 (1943).
55. See Estate of Anna D. Childs, 2 T.C.M. 388 (1943), rev'd o.g. 147 F. 2d
368 (3d Cir. 1945); Edith M. Bensel, 36 B.T.A. 246, aff'd 100 F. 2d 639 (3d Cir.
1938).
56. See Estate of James H. Matthews, 3 T.C. 525 (1944).
57. See Estate of John Q. Strange, B.T.A. Memo. Op., C.C.H. Dec. 12516-D,
April 29, 1942.
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